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Abstract: Collective bargaining (CB) conducted by trade unions and employer associations 
(the social partners) plays a key role in the formation of wages in many countries, with 
potential interactions. This paper investigates the potential interactions of CB with the 
macroeconomy by estimating the business cycle sensitivity of the many thousands of CB 
minimum wages. Drawing on matched worker- and CB data covering all employees in 
Portugal, we find that, over the 1982-2017 period, CB real wages are no more than 0.7 
percent lower when the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point. This is less 
than half the equivalent entry-level effect (1.8) documented in Martins, Solon and Thomas 
(2012). Moreover, much of the sensitivity of CB wages is driven by the high-inflation 
period until 1992, with effects as large as 5.2. Overall, our findings of limited CB real wage 
cyclicality suggest that, in Portugal (and possibly also in other countries in Southern 
Europe), the social partners may not yet have fully adjusted to the macroeconomic regime 
of Eurozone membership. 
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I.  Introduction 
In many countries around the world, large shares of their workforces have their 
wages shaped at the firm-, sectoral- or national-level, in the context of collective bargaining 
between firms and their representatives (employers’ associations) and workers and their 
representatives (trade unions).1 These two types of representatives or economic agents, 
sometimes referred to as ‘social partners’, can therefore play an important role in shaping 
the economic performance of their countries.  
This form of wage determination involving social partners may also represent an 
important departure from the context of search and matching models (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994) in which wages are determined in an individualised manner, within 
worker/employer matches, and through Nash bargaining. In contrast, the collective 
bargaining process, particularly at the sectoral- or national-level, involves a collective form 
of wage determination, stemming from some form of aggregation of heterogenous outside 
options and bargaining power levels. Moreover, the Nash bargaining assumption tends to 
generate significant procyclicality in real wages and much smaller cyclical fluctuations in 
unemployment than actually occur (Shimer, 2005).2  
In contrast, in a collective bargaining context, while individual wages can surpass 
(and, in some specific cases, undercut) collective bargaining (minimum) wages, the latter 
can be critical forces in shaping overall wage developments over the business cycle. More 
specifically, collective bargaining (and its implicit contracts and insurance mechanisms) 
 
1 According to OECD (2019), on average, across OECD member countries, 32% of all workers were covered 
by collective agreements in 2017. In South-western Europe (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal), this share 
increases to over 85%. 
2 Indeed, a number of studies including Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Kennan (2010) have suggested 
including stickiness in real hiring wages as a way of modifying the Mortensen-Pissarides model to generate 
realistically large quantity fluctuations.   
 2 
can introduce substantial rigidity in the wage determination process at all job levels, 
including entry positions, in contrast to the potential volatility driven by Nash bargaining 
in individualized bargaining. 
 This paper contributes empirical evidence to the macroeconomic debate about 
wage rigidity, ongoing at least since Keynes (1936) and including Barro (1977), Bewley 
(1999) and many other contributions. Here we focus on the potentially limited cyclical 
variability of collective bargaining wages and its role in the cyclical volatility of 
employment and unemployment. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which collective 
bargaining real wages respond to the business cycle, as proxied by the unemployment rate. 
Our approach thus complements the existing literature focused on hiring wages (Hall and 
Milgrom, 2008; Pissarides, 2009) which tends to find that these are quite procyclical 
(Carneiro et al, 2012, Martins et al, 2012).3  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that examines what we label here as ‘collective bargaining real wage cyclicality’.4  
A second motivation for our study complementary to the macroeconomic debate 
above concerns the specific case of Southern Europe. The relatively weak economic 
performance over the last 20 years of countries such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal (as well 
as France and Spain to a lesser extent) may be related to an incomplete modernization of 
the political and economic institutions in these countries towards the new macroeconomic 
 
3 There is also a great deal of evidence on real wage cyclicality in general.  For example, using 1967-1987 
data, Solon et al (1994) estimated that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated 
with a 1.2 percent reduction in real wages.  Several other studies using longitudinal microdata from the United 
States and elsewhere have produced similar results (e.g. Bils, 1985; Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991; Devereux 
and Hart, 2006; Martins, 2007).   
4 See Gartner et al (2013) for an analysis of real wage cyclicality under different collective bargaining settings 
in Germany. In contrast to our approach, Gartner et al (2013) consider individuals’ total wages and not the 
collective bargaining wages per se. See also Björklund et al (2019) for an analysis of the duration and renewal 
of collective agreements in Sweden. See Rosolia (2014) for the case of Italy from the perspective of Phillips 
curves, considering 20 sectoral agreements and a sample of firms. 
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regime of low inflation, a fixed exchange rate, and low interest rates that followed from 
Eurozone membership.5  
A potentially important component of these institutions is precisely collective 
bargaining and, more broadly, ‘social dialogue’ or even ‘tripartite dialogue’, the latter 
involving both trade union and employer confederations and the government. In this 
context, examining collective bargaining real wage cyclicality across the Eurozone, both 
before and after the adoption of its regime, as we do in this study, can offer important, 
policy-relevant insights (Blanchard et al, 2014). 
The lack of evidence on collective bargaining real wage cyclicality is related to the 
limited availability of data on collective bargaining wages, in particular over long periods 
of time. We overcome this constraint by considering the case of Portugal, for which we use 
matched worker- and collective-agreement data covering all (private-sector) individual 
employees between 1982 and 2017. Using this large data set, corresponding to over 67 
million individual-year observations, we compute modal wages per each collective-
agreement/job-category/year combination as our proxy for collective bargaining minimum 
wages, following Cardoso and Portugal (2005). We then regress the real values of these 
minimum wages (about 30,000 different values per year (Martins, 2019)) on the 
unemployment rate of the year in which they were in force to estimate our measure of 
collective bargaining real wage cyclicality.  
We find that, on average, over the 1982-2017 period, collective bargaining real 
wages are acyclical in several specifications. Moreover, in general, these real wages are no 
more than 0.7 percent lower when the unemployment rate increases by one percentage 
 
5 See Braga de Macedo (2001) for an informed discussion of the steps towards Eurozone membership in 
Portugal. 
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point. This is less than half the effect (1.8) documented in Martins et al (2012) when 
focusing on entry-level jobs in Portugal using the same data set. We also find that much of 
the limited sensitivity of collective bargaining wages that we find is driven by the high-
inflation period until 1992 (when the macroeconomic regime change began), with effects 
as high as 5.2. Overall, our findings suggest that collective bargaining in Portugal has not 
yet adjusted fully to Eurozone membership, in the sense that collective bargaining 
minimum wages exhibit a very limited degree of responsiveness to the business cycle, 
potentially exacerbating employment fluctuations during downturns. 
Section II discusses the role of collective bargaining upon wage formation, with a 
focus on the case of Portugal.  In section III, we present the data set that we use and several 
descriptive statistics. Section IV presents our main findings about collective bargaining 
real wage cyclicality.  Finally, in section V, we briefly summarize our findings and discuss 
some of their implications. 
 
 
II.  Collective bargaining and wage formation 
Collective bargaining concerns the dialogue and discussions established between 
firms and their representatives, on the one hand, and multiple workers and their 
representatives, on the other hand, regarding wages and other working conditions 
(holidays, overtime premia, health and safety, training, etc.). When employment 
relationships are longer-lasting and firm-specific skills more relevant, the premises of spot 
markets do no longer apply: gaps or wedges will emerge between the outside options of 
each party and their productivity and wages. Bargaining will therefore become more 
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relevant. It can also be conducted individually (between one firm and one worker) and or 
in groups. 
The latter case, of collective bargaining, is seen in many countries, in particular in 
Continental Europe, as a way to promote social dialogue, leading to more harmonious 
industrial relations, economies and even societies, with higher levels of productivity 
(Martins, 2019b) and wages and fewer instances of industrial conflict. The distribution of 
income between labour and capital and within labour itself may become more balanced as 
well. Those countries have thus introduced several regulations and procedures to shape 
collective bargaining in particular directions, with potentially significant effects on wage 
formation, including over the business cycle.  
In the particular case of Portugal (and similarly to several Southern European 
countries), a number of CB or related regulations should be taken into account in this 
context (see also Hijzen et al, 2019). First, employment protection law is relatively 
restrictive as far as open-ended contracts are concerned. Nominal base wages also cannot 
legally be cut in ongoing employment contracts except in exceptional circumstances. This 
strengthens the bargaining power of employees under open-ended contracts and may 
increase downward nominal wage rigidity.6 
Second, sectoral collective agreements (by far the most common type of agreement) 
are virtually automatically extended to all workers in the relevant sector (and region, if 
applicable) through administrative decisions (Martins, 2019a). This practice creates an 
important wedge between trade union density and CB coverage, sometimes of 80% or more 
of total employment, as in the case of France, and of about 50% of total employment in the 
 
6 Moreover, until 2004, according to employment law, collective agreements could not be terminated 
unilaterally in a number of cases. This may have further strengthened the bargaining power of employees. 
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case of Portugal (OECD, 2019), except in the period 2011-2015 (Hijzen and Martins, 
2016). Moreover, there is little flexibility in employment law for firms to deviate 
downwards from CB wages when such firms are suffering from negative demand schocks.  
Third, similarly to the case of statutory minimum wages, CB wages function as 
wage floors, with employers commonly paying wages above those levels (Cardoso and 
Portugal, 2005). However, such CB wages can function as reference or even focal points 
in the hiring of new workers or upon the promotion of existing workers to a higher job 
category. Moreover, while collective agreements include many other clauses than those 
specifically about (minimum) wages, the former tend to add relatively little value compared 
to the already applicable regulations stemming from statutory employment law (Martins 
and Saraiva, 2019). 
    
 
 III.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  Our data come from ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ (Personnel Records), an annual 
mandatory census of all employers in Portugal (except most of the public sector) and all 
their employees.  Employee information is available for every year between 1982 and 2017 
(except 1990 and 2001).  Employee information includes monthly nominal wages (base 
and total), hours of work (base and overtime), collective agreement and its job category 
that applies to each worker, and several other variables (age, gender, schooling, occupation, 
job level, hiring date, etc).  The census takes March of each year as the reference month 
through 1993 and October from 1994 on. The data base suits our purposes very well: by 
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tracking each collective-agreement/job-category (simply agreement/job, henceforth) pair 
longitudinally, we can study how their wages vary over the business cycle.7 
 Our main measure of the collective bargaining minimum wage in each 
agreement/job/year combination is its modal value across all firms and workers. This 
approach was first adopted in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), which show a good 
correspondence between these modes and the actual collective bargaining minimum wages 
in a sample of agreements that they examine in greater detail. Our computation of the mode 
was also based on the real monthly wage of each worker (drawing on Statistics Portugal’s 
monthly consumer price index) rounded to nearest 2017 euro. If a tie occurred, we selected 
the lowest value. The only restriction imposed in the construction of the sample was that 
the number of base hours worked in the reference month is of at least of 140, so to ensure 
that we examine full-time employees, the focus of collective bargaining minimum wages. 
 Table 1 describes the workers considered in each year and their average and modal 
wages. In the first column, we find that the annual number of employees ranges between 
1.3 million in 1984 and 2.5 million in 2008. Average real wages peak in 2010 at 956 euros 
and have their lowest value in 1988 (706 euros). As to our modal (real) wages, they exhibit 
much less fluctuation over the period covered, ranging between 813 and 634 euros, in 1982 
and 1989, respectively. Only in three years (other than 1982) are modal wages higher than 
700 euros (1983, 2010 and 2017). All yearly wages, including the modes, are computed 
using as weights the number of workers in each agreement/job pair. 
 
7 In contrast, Martins et al (2012) is focused exclusively on entry-level jobs (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; 
Baker et al, 1994), defined as specific five-digit occupation codes at the same job level (hierarchy level) in 
each firm. To ensure their “port-of-entry” nature, the job must also account for at least three new hires (with 
up to four months of tenure) and at least 10 percent of the firm’s new hires in at least half the years the firm 
is present in the data. None of restrictions above apply in the present paper, which is not focused on entry-
level wages.  
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Even before taking into account the business cycle – as shown in Figure 1, 
Portugal’s annual unemployment rate varied widely over the period, with peaks in the mid 
1980’s, mid 1990’s, and mid 2010’s –, this time series can already be regarded as indirect 
evidence of acyclical collective bargaining real wages. Note that the high real modal wages 
in the very first years of the series will be driven partially by composition effects stemming 
from higher levels of informality in the early 1980s and possibly imperfect compliance 
with the census at the time, particularly amongst firms in low-wage sectors. Another 
complementary explanation is the very steep increases in collective bargaining wages in 
the mid and late 1970s, following the 1974 revolution and the strong increase in trade union 
bargaining power at it generated. This bargaining power was however eventually eroded 
by the high levels of inflation (and, to a lesser extent, unemployment) in the early 1980s. 
 Table 2 examines the modal wages in different ways. Column 1 presents a count of 
the number of agreement/job pairs per year, showing that this number varies between 
around 26,000 in 1982 and 36,000 in 2016 (Martins, 2019). Columns 2 and 3 present an 
indication of the fit between such modal wages and the corresponding base or total wages 
of the corresponding workers (in the same agreement/job pair), averaged by year, using 
again the number of workers in each pair as weights. In the case of base wages, we find 
that the percentage of workers that are paid exactly the same (real) modal wage ranges 
between 19% in 2006 and 34% in both 2016 and 2017.  
The latter cases may pick up the role of a very steeply increasing statutory minimum 
wage in those two years (which by law overrides the ‘minimum minimorum’ of the 
collective agreements if the latter is lower). However, the overall distribution of modal 
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‘bites’ across the 36-year period covered may be broadly consistent with the view that 
collective bargaining wages tend to be more pressing at times of higher unemployment.  
An important exception to this pattern is 2013, when unemployment was 
particularly high but the collective bargaining bite dropped significantly. This outcome 
may have been influenced by the significant slowdown in the renewal of agreements and 
their non-automatic extension (Hijzen and Martins, 2016), implying that collective 
bargaining wages froze in a large percentage of cases. Automatic wage growth determined 
by tenure-related increments and dismissals or non-renewals of employment contracts of 
younger or less experienced workers (typically on lower wages) would also drive the drop 
in collective bargaining bite over that year. 
If considering instead the mode of the total wage and, we find that its fit with the 
total wages of workers in each agreement/job pair is much lower than in the case of base 
wages. This indicates that total wages (base wages plus additional wage components such 
as overtime pay or bonuses) exhibit much greater dispersion within agreement/job cells.  
Finally, we mention that the version of the data set used in our estimations described 
below has nearly one million observations (992,277), each corresponding to a particular 
agreement/job/year combination, representing an average of 68 workers. There is a total of 
213,770 different agreement/job pairs and 2,186 different agreements. The number of 
different agreements per year increase from little above 400 in the early 1980s to over 800 
in the late 2010s). We also find that each specific agreement/job pair is observed over ten 
years (weighted average).8 
 
8 This possibly relatively low number (in contrast to the 34 years covered in our data) may reflect several 
factors including the emergence of entire novel agreements (including at the firm level, complementing the 
more dominant sectoral agreements), the demise of old agreements, and also some degree of churning in 




IV.  Results 
 Let 𝑤𝑗𝑡 denote the collective bargaining real minimum wage applicable to workers 
in collective agreement and job level pair j in period t, corresponding to the modal base 
wages described above. Our empirical analysis is then based on the following statistical 
model for 𝑤𝑗𝑡: 
(1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑗𝑡 = α𝑗 + β𝑈𝑅𝑡 + ϵ𝑗𝑡, 
where α𝑗  is a set of fixed effects for each agreement/job pair, 𝑈𝑅𝑡 is the unemployment 
rate of year t, and ϵ𝑗𝑡 indicates the zero-mean error term. Given the log-level specification 
adopted, β indicates the percentage change in a collective bargaining real minimum wage 
following a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. 
 We estimate this or adjusted versions of our model in the agreement/job/year data 
set described above (covering the entire period or different subsets) and present the 
coefficient (and standard error) of β in the different rows of Table 3. The first row shows 
the estimated coefficient of the unemployment rate when controlling for a linear time trend 
and using weighted least squares to weight for the number of workers in each 
agreement/job/year observation. In this benchmark estimate, we find a coefficient estimate 
of -0.15 (with an estimated standard error 0.13), indicating that there is not a significant 
relationship between the business cycle and CB wages. However, despite the lack of 
precision of the estimate, its confidence interval is not wide enough to reach cases of highly 
 
to a new collective agreement code. According to our analysis, agreement turnover was particularly high in 
2004, when employment law allowed for the unilateral revocation of collective agreements, and in 2012, 
when the administrative extensions of agreements were restricted (Hijzen and Martins, 2019). 
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procyclical real wages, in contrast to the literature on entry-level (not necessarily CB-
based) wages. 
This result of limited procyclicality is also consistent with our original eyeballing 
of the data in Table 1, by comparing mean modal wages over the 36-year period covered. 
However, this contrasts with the micro literature on real wage cyclicality, which finds 
significant evidence of procyclicality, including in the case of Portugal (Carneiro et al 
(2012) and Martins et al (2012)). Next, we investigate further this finding, regarding the 
specific and novel case of CB real wage cyclicality, by conducting several robustness 
checks and extensions. 
 In the next row of Table 2, we use ordinary least squares instead of weighted least 
squares.  The resulting coefficient estimate, -0.44 (with estimated standard error 0.10), is 
larger and more precise than the weighted result.  However, the implied procyclicality in 
this specification is still much lower than that found in other longitudinal studies.  
In the third row, we consider only those agreement/job pairs that pay below median 
wages, in which the reference median is computed across all modal wages in each year. 
This represents a subset of CB that may be closer to the entry wages in ‘ports of entry’ that 
are more relevant from the perspective of the macroeconomic debate discussed in the 
Introduction. We find again, as in the first row, a very small and statistically insignificant 
coefficient (0.04, with a standard error of 0.24).  
 In the next three rows, we redo the regression from row 1 except that we consider 
alternative wage measures: the average base wage, the average total wage, and the modal 
hourly wage. We find in all cases statistically significant coefficients, ranging between -
0.53 and -0.70. These point estimates are all higher (in absolute terms) than the previous 
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cases with significant estimates but still lower (by half or more) than the existing cyclicality 
estimates using longitudinal data. 
 In row 7 we consider a different approach towards the weighting of the data, not 
based on the total number of workers in each agreement/job pair but considering instead 
the number of workers that is actually paid the modal wage in each observation. Again, we 
find an insignificant coefficient of 0.07 (standard error of 0.19).  
All the figures above contrast considerably with those of Martins et al (2012), in 
which real wage cyclicality was found to be at around -1.8 (row 8). In order to compare as 
closely as possible that figure under the present methodology focused on CB wages, we 
redo our analysis of row 1 but considering only the same time period as in Martins et al 
(2012). Row 9 presents a coefficient of 0.74 (standard error 0.31), indicating that our focus 
on CB wages, as opposed to the more specific subset of entry wages, cuts the degree of 
cyclicality in half.9  
Of course, “cyclical upgrading” may underestimate procyclicality: if, in a 
recession, employers recruit a higher quality of workers at any given wage, the effective 
wage they pay per efficiency unit of labour is lower. This process is likely to apply in CB 
as well and we see no reason why it could be strong or differentiated enough to explain the 
big difference in cyclicality that we present here.  
 Finally, we revisit the macroeconomic regime change mentioned in the 
Introduction. Portugal and other Southern European countries underwent a significant 
change in their macroeconomic context in the run up to Eurozone membership, involving 
a steep decrease in inflation and increasingly more stable exchange rates. To what extent 
 
9 For the sake of completeness, we also estimate CB cyclicality for the remaining period of 2009-2017, in 
which we find nearly the same estimates as in the earlier period (row 10 of Table 3).  
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did CB cyclicality evolve and adjust as this macroeconomic regime adapted? We shed light 
on this question by running our main specification separately for the period before and after 
this regime change. We choose 1992 as the threshold year, based on Braga de Macedo 
(2001).  
Our findings are striking: when considering the 1982-1992 period (row 11), we 
estimate a very high degree of procyclicality, with a coefficient of -5.17. Given that the 
standard error is 2.73, the coefficient is not extremely precise even if still significant at the 
10% level. On the other hand, when considering the remaining period (1993-2017; row 
12), we find again very small and insignificant cyclicality effects, in this case with a 
coefficient of -0.23 (standard error 0.10). These results indicate that CB real wage 
cyclicality decreased dramatically as the macroeconomic regime of Portugal changed from 
high inflation, high interest rates and high government deficits, under the frequent 
devaluation of the then national currency (‘crawling-peg’ system), as described in Braga 
de Macedo (1990), towards the very opposite context, along all these dimensions, in the 
run up to the Euro and during Euro membership. 
 
 
IV.  Summary and Discussion 
 Collective bargaining conducted by trade unions and employer associations (the 
social partners) can play a key role in the formation of wages in many countries, with 
potentially significant interactions with the macroeconomy. In this paper, we quantified for 
the first time the business cycle sensitivity of the many minimum wages set in collective 
bargaining in a country. Our analysis is based on matched worker- and collective-
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agreement data covering all private-sector employees in Portugal over the 1982-2017 
period.  
Our first main result is that, in contrast to the literature focused on the longitudinal 
analysis of individual wages, CB real wages appear to be largely acyclical. Indeed, we find 
that, on average, CB wages are no more than 0.7 percent lower when the unemployment 
rate increases by one percentage point. This is less than half the entry-level effect (1.8) 
documented in Martins et al (2012). The same comparison result also applies when 
restricting our CB sample period to match that of Martins et al (2012), 1982-2008, and in 
several robustness checks.  
We also find that much of the sensitivity of collective bargaining wages is driven 
by the high-inflation period in Portugal, until 1992, in which CB real wage effects are as 
high as 5.2. As the economy changed its regime to prepare and then join the Eurozone, 
with radically lower inflation rates, CB real wage cyclicality diminished dramatically. In 
other words, the ability of CB wages to adjust to the business cycle nearly disappeared, 
which may have increased the sensitivity and volatility of employment and unemployment. 
In particular, this may explain, at least in part, the large response of unemployment to the 
2011-2014 crisis, at least up to 2013, when the unemployment rate exceeded 16%.  
These findings suggest that collective bargaining in Portugal has not adjusted to the 
macroeconomic regime change associated to Eurozone membership. As soon as inflation 
stopped ‘greasing the wheels’ of the labour market, CB real wages stopped or nearly 
stopped responding to the business cycle, which may have aggravated the employment 
consequences of that same business cycle (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2013). Of course, not 
all workers are paid the CB wages (on average, in our data, around 25% are paid the modal 
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value of their agreement/job pair), something which will restrict the relevance of CB 
wages. On the other hand, these workers that are paid CB wages will typically be less 
skilled individuals, that have joined their firms more recently, and that are employed under 
fixed-term contracts, all dimensions will already make them more vulnerable to the 
business cycle.  
As stated in Martins et al (2012), “[the literature] requires not a theory of wage 
rigidity, but a theory of why wages are not even more variable than they are.” Our results 
from longitudinal population micro data indicate that collective bargaining may be part of 
such theory, at least in some countries. Most of the procyclicality documented earlier will 
be driven by the ‘wage cushion’ between actual wages and CB wages, while CB wages are 
largely acyclical, at least in periods of low inflation. We hope that the simple methodology 
presented in this paper will be applied to additional countries. Further evidence would be 
particularly interesting from countries in which social partners have operated under a low-
inflation environment for a longer period of time and or face greater flexibility to 
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Figure 1.  Annual Unemployment and Inflation Rates in Portugal, 1982-2018 
 
 
Source:  Statistics Portugal (INE) and Pordata. 
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Table 1.  Sample Sizes and Average Weighted Salaries by Year 
 
                                N.           Nominal         Real       Modal real 
                             Year         Workers                            Salary 
     1982          1538917             85.1           864.9           812.9 
     1983          1550507           101.0           780.1           739.9 
     1984          1334338           123.6           682.6           645.2 
     1986          1506146           176.1           684.5           641.5 
     1987          1543241           203.3           713.2           671.8 
     1988          1597997           223.4           706.3           657.5 
     1989          1737154           252.5           698.5           634.0 
     1991          1760303           346.1           729.7           649.2 
     1992          1796795           396.0           754.7           664.6 
     1993          1757991           439.5           780.6           671.9 
     1994          1753774           473.9           796.2           671.1 
     1995          1779220           489.2           787.6           665.6 
     1996          1777333           518.7           809.1           678.1 
     1997          1908168           529.4           806.8           664.0 
     1998          1935118           559.5           830.5           687.9 
     1999          2035372           579.8           840.8           681.5 
     2000          2105047           604.0           850.5           687.4 
     2002          2199269           668.7           867.8           693.8 
     2003          2239089           689.3           865.9           685.0 
     2004          2285091           714.7           876.2           681.4 
     2005          2407842           741.4           888.1           668.5 
     2006          2440077           762.4           885.0           666.3 
     2007          2498262           780.9           883.8           661.1 
     2008          2541942           816.0           899.5           671.4 
     2009          2412114           843.8           937.5           699.2 
     2010          2307517           872.5           955.8           716.5 
     2011          2267542           880.7           929.2           697.1 
     2012          2114102           891.9           914.6           682.7 
     2013          2262414           873.1           892.6           675.0 
     2014          2315508           876.8           899.1           677.9 
     2015          2206253           890.5           908.5           686.9 
     2016          2283859           901.6           914.5           694.7 
     2017          2379251           918.4           918.4           703.2 
 
Notes: N. Workers indicates the number of individuals (full-time workers) considered in 
the analysis of each year; Nominal salary is the value in euros of each year of the mean 
base salary paid in the country; Real salary is the real version of the previous column 
(considering 2017 prices); Modal real salary is our measure of the (real) minimum wages 
set by collective agreement/job level pairs (weighted by the number of workers under each 
agreement/job pair). Source: Author’s analysis based on the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data set. 
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Table 2.  Number of Agreement/Jobs by Year and their Fit 
 
                                                           N.                   % (salary) 
      Agreements/         base  total  
   Year  Jobtitles         equal to mode 
1982 26,532  0.31 0.14 
1983 27,367  0.31 0.14 
1984 26,288  0.32 0.14 
1986 28,248  0.33 0.16 
1987 28,696  0.32 0.16 
1988 28,543  0.29 0.15 
1989 29,969  0.28 0.15 
1991 29,848  0.28 0.13 
1992 29,681  0.25 0.11 
1993 29,390  0.23 0.10 
1994 30,146  0.25 0.12 
1995 30,886  0.29 0.13 
1996 30,561  0.28 0.13 
1997 30,519  0.27 0.12 
1998 30,219  0.27 0.12 
1999 29,730  0.27 0.12 
2000 29,285  0.25 0.11 
2002 28,456  0.21 0.09 
2003 29,072  0.22 0.09 
2004 29,559  0.21 0.09 
2005 29,178  0.21 0.09 
2006 28,570  0.19 0.08 
2007 28,679  0.21 0.09 
2008 28,868  0.21 0.09 
2009 28,082  0.23 0.10 
2010 28,156  0.23 0.08 
2011 28,088  0.30 0.15 
2012 33,947  0.30 0.16 
2013 34,654  0.22 0.08 
2014 34,963  0.26 0.09 
2015 35,196  0.32 0.16 
2016 35,640  0.34 0.16 
2017 35,262  0.34 0.16  
 
Notes: N. agreements/jobtitles indicates the number of different jobtitles across agreements 
available in the collective agreements applicable in each year; % base equal to mode 
indicates the percentage of workers that are paid a base wage equal to the model base wage 
of their agreement/jobtitle pair; % total equal to mode indicates the percentage of workers 
that are paid a total wage equal to the model total wage of their agreement/jobtitle pair 
(weighted statistics). Source: Author’s analysis based on the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data set. 
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Table 3.  Estimates of the Cyclicality of Log Collective Bargaining Wages 
Estimation Method and Sample Estimated Unemployment Rate 
Coefficient (and Standard Error) 
1.  Log modal monthly wage weighted regression, 
including linear trend, 1982-2017 
-0.15 
(0.13) 




3.  Same as (1) for low-wage (below annual 
median) job levels 
0.03 
(0.24) 
4.  Same as (1) with log average base wage -0.53 
(0.16) 
5.  Same as (1) with log average total wage -0.67 
(0.22) 
6.  Same as (1) with log modal hourly wage -0.70 
(0.27) 
7.  Same as (1) with weights corresponding to the 
number of workers paid the modal value 
-0.07 
(0.19) 
8. Closest specification to (1) in Martins et al 
(2012) [row 1 in Table 2, page 46] 
-1.81 
(0.38) 
9.  Same as (1) for 1982-2008 -0.74 
(0.31) 
10.  Same as (1) for 2009-2017 -0.72 
(0.14) 
11.  Same as (1) for 1982-1992 -5.17 
(2.73) 
12.  Same as (1) for 1993-2017 -0.23 
(0.10) 
 
Notes: Each coefficient corresponds to a different wage regression, based on a different 
specification and or a different sample. Weights correspond to the number of workers in 
each agreement/jobtitle (regardless of whether they are paid at the modal level). All 
specifications except 3 and 8-12 draw on 937,397 observations, each corresponding to an 
agreement/jobtitle pair in a given year over the period 1982-2017. All specifications control 
for up to 158,872 agreement/jobtitle fixed effects. Clustering of standard errors by year. 
All coefficients are significant at the 5% level except those of specifications 1, 7 and 11. 
Specification 11 is significant at the 10% level. Source: Author’s analysis based on the 
‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data. 
  
 
 
